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“WIRE” CIRCUIT COURTS SPLIT ON CABLE 
PIRACY: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT EXAMINES 
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW IN 
J&J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. MANDELL 
FAMILY VENTURES 
Abstract: On May 2, 2014, in J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family 
Ventures, LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned the lower 
court’s decision and held that section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 does 
not apply to the unauthorized reception of cable wire transmissions originating as 
radio communications. The Fifth Circuit joined the Seventh and Third Circuits in 
maintaining that section 553 of the Communications Act of 1934 exclusively regu-
lates this unauthorized reception after analyzing the legislative history and con-
gressional intent behind the federal regulation. The Second Circuit, alternatively, 
has ruled that section 605 does regulate such transmissions. This Comment argues 
that the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934 is correct. 
To rule otherwise would unreasonably impose the obligation on customers to take 
the additional step to verify that their cable provider has a license to provide the ca-
ble program. Furthermore, to apply section 605 would irrationally limit section 553 
to only the regulation of local cable providers. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal telecommunications laws distinguish between the regulation of ca-
ble wire transmissions and radio transmissions with respect to cable piracy.1 Sec-
tion 553 of the Communications Act of 1934 governs cable wire transmissions, 
and section 605 governs radio transmissions.2 After Congress amended section 
605 in 1968 and then enacted section 553 in 1984, circuit courts have struggled 
with applying these separate provisions to modern multi-step transmission pro-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(a), 605(a) (2012). “Radio transmissions” 
refers to communications sent over-the-air via radio waves or satellite, whereas cable wire transmis-
sions are defined as communications sent via hard wire or coaxial cable. See id. § 153(40), (59); Char-
ter Commc’ns Entm’t I, DST v. Burdulis, 460 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing definitions of 
radio transmissions and cable wire transmissions); see also Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation 
Versus Antitrust: How Net Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1651 n.118 
(2011) (stating that cable is the delivery of television broadcast signals over coaxial cable, or wire, and 
the government’s regulation of cable communication is ancillary to the regulation of over-the-air, or 
radio, communications). 
 2 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(a), 605(a). 
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cesses involving both mediums.3 Specifically, courts have struggled to apply 
these regulations where a cable provider sends programming via radio which is 
then retransmitted through cable wire to the customer.4 In 2014, in J&J Sports 
Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit joined the Seventh and Third Circuits in holding that section 605, 
the radio transmission section, does not apply to this multi-step retransmission 
process.5 The court concluded that section 553, the cable wire transmission sec-
tion, exclusively governs these multi-step communications when the reception 
by the customer occurs after the radio signal is retransmitted via cable wire.6 
Alternatively, the Second Circuit has interpreted section 605 to apply to this mul-
ti-step retransmission process after reviewing the relevant case law and ex-
pressed legislative intent accompanying the enactment of section 553 in 1984.7 
This Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit appropriately reversed the low-
er court’s application of section 605, thereby avoiding the imposition of an un-
reasonable obligation on cable customers and irrationally limiting section 553 to 
only the regulation of local cable programming.8 This Comment also argues that, 
on remand, the lower court should dismiss the claims against the defendants.9 
Part I of this Comment discusses the factual and procedural history of J&J 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2796 (codi-
fied as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 553); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 223 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605); J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. 
Mandell Family Ventures, LLC, 751 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2014); Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 
669, 673 (5th Cir. 2001). The development of satellite transmission technology led to tremendous 
growth of the national cable industry, allowing cable providers to create complex transmission pro-
cesses to access more parts of the country. See TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 204 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 4 Compare J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 351 (holding that section 605 does not regulate cable wire 
communications) and TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 207 (same), with Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 75 
F.3d 123, 133 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding section 605 regulates cable wire communications). 
 5 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 352–53; TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 207; United States v. Norris, 88 
F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 6 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 352–53. In these multi-step transmission processes, courts apply 
section 553 or section 605 depending upon when the unauthorized reception occurs. See id. If the 
unauthorized reception occurs during the initial radio transmission, courts apply section 605, but if the 
unauthorized reception occurs after the radio signal is retransmitted via cable wire, courts are split in 
applying section 605 or section 553. See id. Compare Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 133 (holding that 
section 605 applies to piracy of cable wire transmission which originated as radio or satellite transmis-
sion), with Norris, 88 F.3d at 469 (holding only section 553, not section 605, applies to unauthorized 
reception of cable services even if originating as radio or satellite transmission). 
 7 See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 133 (applying section 605 to hold defendant liable for selling 
cable television descramblers which pirate cable wire communications); H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–
84 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4720–21. 
 8 See infra notes 69–92 and accompanying text; see also J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Mandell Fami-
ly Ventures, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-02489-BF, 2012 WL 4757694, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2012) (hold-
ing that section 605 regulates multi-step retransmission processes). 
 9 See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
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Sports and reviews the legislative history of the relevant statutes.10 Part II ex-
plains the split among U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal in determining whether sec-
tion 605 regulates modern multi-step retransmission processes such as those in 
J&J Sports.11 Finally, Part III argues that the Fifth, Seventh, and Third Circuits 
correctly interpreted Congress’s intent by holding that section 553 exclusively 
governs the unauthorized reception of cable wire transmissions to protect inno-
cent cable customers such as the defendants in J&J Sports.12 
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATIONS AND J&J SPORTS 
Over the course of the development national television industry, Congress 
has responded to issues of cable piracy with sweeping regulation.13 This regula-
tion, however, has not occurred without setbacks—courts have struggled to ap-
ply the cable piracy provisions to modern industry practices because of the am-
biguous development of the Communications Act of 1934.14 Section A of this 
Part examines the ambiguous development of the Communications Act since 
1964 and the effect of this ambiguity on courts around the country.15 Section B 
of this Part details the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the relevant provisions.16 
A. History of the Communications Act of 1934 
The ambiguous development of the Communications Act since 1964 has 
left courts divided in interpreting the application of section 605 of the Act, which 
regulates radio communications, and section 553, which regulates cable wire 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 13–44 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 45–68 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 69–92 and accompanying text. 
 13 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amend-
ed at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (2012)) (establishing provisions regulating the unauthorized reception 
of cable wire and radio transmissions); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 223 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605) (removing references to cable 
wire transmissions in section 605); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-549, 98 
Stat. 2779, 2796 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 553) (enacting section 553 to regulate cable wire 
transmissions); see also Norris, 88 F.3d at 469 (detailing the history of federal telecommunications 
regulation concerning cable piracy). 
 14 See Andrew Russell, Comment, Placeshifting, the Slingbox, and Cable Theft Statutes: Will 
Slingbox Use Land You in Prison?, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1239, 1254–55 (2008) (detailing the circuit split 
regarding the application of the Communications Act to cable piracy). Compare Int’l Cablevision, 75 
F.3d at 133 (holding that section 605 applies to piracy of cable wire transmission which originated as 
radio or satellite transmission), with Norris, 88 F.3d at 469 (holding only section 553, not section 605, 
applies to unauthorized reception of cable services even if originating as radio or satellite transmis-
sion). 
 15 See infra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 26–44 and accompanying text. 
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transmissions, to modern multi-step transmission processes.17 Section 605 re-
quires higher statutory damages than section 553, but both sections hold custom-
ers strictly liable for their unauthorized reception, which imbues great signifi-
cance on the ambiguous application of sections 553 and 605.18 The separation of 
the regulation of radio and cable wire communications dates back to 1968 when 
Congress amended section 605(a) to remove references to cable wire transmis-
sions in the two relevant portions of the provision.19 In doing so, Congress left 
cable wire transmissions to be regulated by a different set of statutes.20 In 1968, 
the new telecommunication law created a gap in cable wire regulation, causing 
some courts to apply section 605 to cable transmissions.21 
The gap ultimately led to the adoption of the Cable Communications Policy 
Act of 1984, which established section 553 to regulate cable wire piracy.22 Since 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(a), 605. Compare Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 133 (holding that section 
605 applies to piracy of cable wire transmission which originated as radio or satellite transmission), 
with Norris, 88 F.3d at 469 (holding only section 553, not section 605, applies to unauthorized recep-
tion of cable services even if originating as radio or satellite transmission). Congress enacted these 
new telecommunications regulations in an attempt to combat cable piracy caused by the rapid growth 
of the television industry in the 1970s after the advent of satellite programming. See Cable Communi-
cations Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2796 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 
§ 553) (enacting section 553 to regulate cable wire transmissions); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 223 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605) 
(removing references to cable wire transmissions in section 605); TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 204 (de-
scribing these developments). 
 18 See Russell, supra note 14, at 1266 (noting that cable providers continued to use section 605 
in lawsuits against cable pirates even after Congress enacted section 553). Compare 47 U.S.C. 
§ 605(e)(3)(B)(iii)–(C)(iii) (requiring higher statutory minimum damages and mandatory attorney’s 
fees), with § 553(c)(2)(C)–(3)(C) (requiring lower statutory minimum damages and discretionary 
attorney’s fees). 
 19 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 
223 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)); Norris, 88 F.3d at 465. The 1968 amendments to 
section 605(a) changed the words “any communication” to “any radio communication” in the second 
sentence of the provision and deleted reference to communication “by wire” in the third sentence, 
while leaving a reference to cable wire transmission in the first sentence which regulates acts by 
communication personnel. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. at 223; Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 130 
(detailing this amendment to section 605). 
 20 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 
212–13 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2012)) (providing regulations for the inter-
ception of oral and wire communications); Norris, 88 F.3d at 465. 
 21 See Norris, 88 F.3d at 465–66; Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 130. Relegating cable wire trans-
missions to regulations under title 18 created this gap, as these provisions do not apply to cable televi-
sion providers. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (defining the wire communications regulated under title 18 as 
only those transmitted through a wire or cable facility operated by a common carrier); United States v. 
Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169 n.29 (1968) (holding that cable television providers are not com-
mon carriers); see also Norris, 88 F.3d at 455–66 (reviewing the statutory and case law developments 
resulting in this gap). 
 22 Pub. L. No 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2796 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 553); see Norris, 
88 F.3d at 466. The growth of satellite technology and its importance in the growth of the national 
cable industry led to the use of home satellite systems to illegally intercept television programs, con-
tributing to the need for Congress to enact the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. See David 
22 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
the Act’s enactment, courts around the country have struggled with the applica-
tion of federal telecommunications laws to the modern, multi-step retransmis-
sions processes involving both radio and cable wire that are practiced by compa-
nies such as Time Warner Cable.23 As a result, courts are divided on whether 
section 605 applies to the scenario where a cable provider sends programming 
via radio that is then retransmitted through cable wire to a customer, at which 
time the unauthorized reception occurs.24 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit confronted this issue after the defendants in J&J Sports Productions, Inc. 
v. Mandell Family Ventures, LLC were sued for unauthorized reception of a 
Floyd Mayweather fight.25 
B. The Background of J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family 
Ventures 
In 2010, J&J Sports filed suit against the defendants, seeking to hold them 
strictly liable under section 553 and section 605 of the Communications Act for 
their unauthorized reception of the Floyd Mayweather fight.26 On December 8, 
2007, the Greenville Avenue Pizza Company, owned by Mandell Family Ven-
tures, LLC, paid for and received the pay-per-view Welterweight Championship 
boxing fight between Floyd “Money” Mayweather and Ricky Hatton.27 Mandell 
Family Ventures ordered the fight through their cable provider Time Warner Ca-
                                                                                                                           
V. Lampman, II, The Unusual Suspects: Unscrambling Satellite Piracy, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 553, 565–67 (2004) (detailing the growth and effect of satellite television technology and the 
impact on widespread cable piracy). 
 23 See, e.g., J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 352 (holding that section 553 exclusively governs these 
communications); Norris, 88 F.3d at 465–66 (same); Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 130 (holding that 
section 553 exclusively governs these communications). 
 24 Compare Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 133 (holding section 605 applies to piracy of cable wire 
transmission which originated as radio or satellite transmission), with Norris, 88 F.3d at 469 (holding 
only section 553, not section 605, applies to unauthorized reception of cable services even if originat-
ing as radio or satellite transmission). 
 25 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348. 
 26 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(a), 605(a) (2012); J&J Sports, 2012 WL 4757694, at *2. Plaintiffs com-
monly argue for a violation of section 605 because the statutory damages are higher in section 605 
than in section 553, and section 605 requires an award of attorney’s fees, while section 553 gives the 
court discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii)–(C)(iii) (requiring 
higher statutory minimum damages and mandatory attorney’s fees), with § 553(c)(2)(C)–(3)(C) (re-
quiring lower statutory minimum damages and discretionary attorney’s fees). Ultimately, the court 
awarded J&J Sports statutory damages in the amount of $350 as well as costs and attorney’s fees in 
the amount of $26,780.30. See J&J Sports, 2012 WL 4757694 at *5. The district court awarded dam-
ages according to both section 605 and section 553, as both provisions allow the court to exercise its 
discretion to reduce damages for innocent, good faith defendants. See 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(C) (al-
lowing a reduction to $100); § 605(e)(3)(C)(iii) (allowing a reduction to $250); J&J Sports, No. 3:10-
CV-02489-BF, 2012 WL 4757694 at *5. 
 27 J&J Sports, 2012 WL 4757694, at *5. The restaurant did not advertise the event, nor did the 
bar have a liquor license or charge a commission to view the fight in their establishment. Id. 
2015] The Fifth Circuit Examines Federal Telecommunication Law 23 
ble, (“TWC”).28 TWC, whose communications processes begin as satellite 
transmissions that are then retransmitted via cable wire and sent to the customer, 
mistakenly authorized and transmitted the program to Mandell Family Ven-
tures.29 TWC transmitted the program despite only having the license to broad-
cast the fight to venues not accessible to the public.30 Instead, the plaintiff, J&J 
Sports Productions, owned the license to broadcast the boxing match to closed-
circuit commercial entities such as Mandell Family Ventures.31 The district court 
granted the J&J Sports’ motion for summary judgment without specifically indi-
cating whether Mandell Family Ventures was liable under section 553 or section 
605.32 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed whether summary judgment was 
appropriate in this case under either section 553 or section 605.33 
The Fifth Circuit held that a dispute of material fact existed as to whether 
Mandell Family Ventures violated section 553, holding that J&J Sports’ motion 
for summary judgment could not survive under this provision.34 Although sec-
tion 553 imposes strict liability for the unauthorized reception of communica-
tions delivered via cable wire, the provision includes a “safe harbor” exclusion 
that protects a majority of cable customers from liability.35 Courts have inter-
preted this safe harbor to apply to cable customers who are specifically author-
ized by their cable operator to receive the service, regardless of whether or not 
that cable operator had the license to transmit the program to the customer.36 
The Fifth Circuit then analyzed whether the J&J Sports’ motion for sum-
mary judgment would survive under section 605.37 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit 
held that section 605 does not apply to the receipt of an unauthorized cable wire 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 347. 
 29 Id. at 347, 352. 
 30 Id. at 347. 
 31 Id. In Texas, the fight could legally be displayed only in theaters, bars, clubs, lounges, and 
restaurants if the establishment had an agreement with J&J Sports. See J&J Sports, 2012 WL 4757694 
at *2. 
 32 J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348. 
 33 Id. at 347. 
 34 Id. at 350. The court ruled a dispute of material fact existed because Mandell Family Ventures 
was specifically authorized by TWC to receive the fight and a reasonable jury could find that they fall 
within the safe harbor in section 553. See id.  
 35 See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “no person shall intercept or receive or assist 
in the intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless spe-
cifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by 
law”) (emphasis added). 
 36 J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348–50; see also J&J Prods., Inc. v. Schmalz, 745 F. Supp. 2d 844, 
851 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (holding customer need only receive program from a cable operator, not an 
authorized or licensed cable operator, in order to receive protection from section 553 safe harbor). The 
court ruled a dispute of material fact existed because the defendants were specifically authorized by 
TWC to receive the fight and a reasonable jury could find that they fall within the safe harbor in sec-
tion 553. See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 350. 
 37 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 350 
24 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
communication that originated via radio or satellite.38 The court noted that sec-
tion 605 does not contain a safe harbor and recognized that courts are divided as 
to the applicability of this section to transmissions via cable wire.39 Both J&J 
Sports and Mandell Family Ventures used this circuit split to bolster their argu-
ments on appeal.40 J&J Sports argued that Mandell Family Ventures was liable 
under section 605 because the transmission of the Mayweather fight originated 
via radio and was therefore “incidental” to the radio transmission so as to invoke 
section 605.41 Alternatively, Mandell Family Ventures argued that section 605 
prohibits the unauthorized receipt of only radio or satellite communications, not 
the cable wire transmissions through which they received the boxing match.42 
Mandell Family Ventures pointed to the relevant statutory language which only 
refers to radio transmissions without mentioning cable wire transmissions.43 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that J&J Sports’ motion for summary judgment could 
not survive under either section 605 or section 553, and thus reversed the lower 
court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.44 
II. CIRCUITS STRUGGLE WITH INTERPRETING CONGRESS’S CHANGES TO 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW 
Following the amendments to section 605 in 1968 and the enactment of 
section 553 in 1984, courts have struggled to apply federal communications reg-
ulations to multi-step transmission processes of modern national cable providers 
involving both radio and cable wire transmissions.45 In 1996, the U.S. Courts of 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. at 353. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that J&J’s argument of an incidental transmission “unac-
ceptably blurs the lines” between radio and cable wire communications, and the statutory framework 
of the federal telecommunications laws with separate provisions for radio and cable wire transmis-
sions support their decision. See id. at 352–53. 
 39 See id. at 351; Prostar, 239 F.3d at 673 (recognizing the divide among courts as to the applica-
bility of sections 553 and 605 to modern multi-step retransmission processes). 
 40 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 350–52. 
 41 See id. at 352; see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(40) (2012) (defining radio communication as the 
transmission by radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kind, including all instru-
mentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services incidental to such transmission). 
 42 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 350–51. 
 43 See 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2012) (stating “no person not entitled thereto shall receive or assist in 
receiving any interstate or foreign communication by radio and use such communication” (emphasis 
added)); J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 350–51. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that J&J’s argument of an inci-
dental transmission “unacceptably blurs the lines” between radio and cable wire communications, and 
noted that the statutory framework of the federal telecommunications laws—with separate provisions 
for radio and cable wire transmissions—supports their decision. See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 352–53. 
 44 J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 353. 
 45 See J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures, LLC, 751 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 
2014); United States v. Norris, 88 F.3d 462, 465–66 (7th Cir. 1996); Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 
75 F.3d 123, 133 (2d Cir. 1996). This is different from local cable programming, which usually 
transmits only through cable wire. See TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 205 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
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Appeals for the Seventh and Second Circuits heard cases implicating section 605 
and its application to the unauthorized receipt of cable wire transmissions which 
originated as radio communication, and reached different conclusions.46 Section 
A of this Part examines the Second Circuit’s decision to apply Section 605 to this 
unauthorized reception (the “inclusive approach”).47 Section B details the differ-
ent interpretation of section 605 reached by the Seventh and Third Circuits hold-
ing that section 553 exclusively regulates this multi-step retransmission process 
of cable providers when the unauthorized reception occurs after the cable wire 
retransmission, (“the exclusive approach”).48 
A. The Inclusive Approach: Applying Section 605 to Multi-Step 
Retransmission Processes 
In 2001, in International Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that section 605 regulates the unauthorized re-
ception of cable wire transmissions originating as radio communications.49 The 
court relied on pre-1984 case law and Congress’ expressed intent to hold that 
section 605 governs these multistep retransmission processes.50 First, although 
the court acknowledged that the 1968 amendments to section 605 could be read 
to eliminate the provision’s applicability to cable wire transmissions, the court 
instead deferred to a significant body of case law across the country that contin-
ued to apply section 605 to cable wire transmission after these amendments.51 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Compare Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 133 (holding section 605 applies to piracy of cable wire 
transmission which originated as radio or satellite transmission), with Norris, 88 F.3d at 469 (holding 
only section 553, not section 605, applies to unauthorized reception of cable services even if originat-
ing as radio or satellite transmission). Both International Cablevision and Norris involved claims 
made against defendants attempting to sell cable decoding equipment that would allow cable custom-
ers to steal unauthorized premium cable. See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 126; Norris, 88 F.3d at 463. 
 47 See infra notes 49–57 and accompanying text. This Comment uses the term “inclusive ap-
proach” to describe the Second Circuit’s approach of applying both section 553 and section 605 to 
these multi-step communication where a radio signal is retransmitted over cable wire at which time 
the unauthorized reception occurs. See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 126; see, e.g., infra notes 69, 81 
(employing this terminology). 
 48 See infra notes 58–68 and accompanying text. This Comment uses the term “exclusive ap-
proach” to describe the approach of the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, which apply section 553 
exclusively to multi-step retransmissions. See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 351; TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 
205; Norris, 88 F.3d at 469; see, e.g., infra notes 64, 68 and accompanying text (employing this ter-
minology). 
 49 See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 133 (reviewing case against a defendant who sold cable televi-
sion descramblers which allow cable piracy). 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. at 130 (detailing four cases, Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984), Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Annasonic Elec. Supply, No. CV-83-5159, 1984 WL 254933 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984), Porter Cnty. Cable Co. v. Moyer, 624 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ind. 1983), and Cox 
Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983), which applied section 605 to 
unauthorized reception of cable wire television). Before 1968, section 605 included references to 
“communication by wire or radio” but after the amendments these references were removed in the 
26 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
The Second Circuit held that these cases reinforced the plausibility of interpret-
ing section 605 to regulate cable wire transmissions.52 The court ultimately 
adopted this interpretation after reviewing the statements made by Congress in 
connection with the enactment of section 553 in 1984.53 
Second, the court in International Cablevision held that Congress’s ex-
pressed intent regarding the pre-1984 case law supports the conclusion that sec-
tion 605 applies to cable wire transmissions.54 The Second Circuit relied on a 
statement from Congress elaborating on the intended application of section 553 
noting that the enactment of section 503 should not affect the applicability of 
section 605 to cable piracy.55 The court also highlighted a note from the commit-
tee chair responsible for the enactment of section 553, which stated that the en-
actment of section 553 should not affect existing case law applying section 605 
to acts of cable piracy.56 These statements, coupled with the supporting pre-1984 
case law, led the Second Circuit to hold that section 605 governs the unauthor-
ized reception of cable wire communications that originate as a radio transmis-
sion.57 
B. The Exclusive Approach: Section 553 Alone Governs the  
Multi-Step Retransmission Processes 
As an alternative to the Second Circuit’s “inclusive” approach, in 1996, in 
United States v. Norris, the U.S. Appeals Court for the Seventh Circuit ruled that 
section 605 does not apply to the unauthorized reception of cable wire transmis-
sions that originate as radio communications.58 Like the Second Circuit, the 
                                                                                                                           
relevant portions dealing with cable piracy. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964) (including references to 
wire or radio communications), with § 605 (2012) (omitting these references in current version of the 
law as amended by 1968 Act). 
 52 See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 131. The court in International Cablevision acknowledged 
that these cases did not thoroughly analyze section 605’s language as amended in 1968, noting this as 
an attenuated statutory construction. See id. 
 53 See id. at 132–33. 
 54 See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–84 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4720–
21. 
 55 See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 132; H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–84, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720–21 (stating “[n]othing in [section 553] is intended to affect the applicability of 
existing Section 605 to theft of cable service”). 
 56 See 130 CONG. REC. S14287 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood), (stating 
that “[section 553] is intended to leave undisturbed the case law that has developed confirming the 
broad reach of section 605 as a deterrent against piracy of protected communications”). Senator 
Packwood continued to state that “[i]t is the Committee’s intention that the amendment preserve these 
broad protections [provided by section 605]; that all acts which presently constitute a violation of 
[section 605] shall continue to be unlawful under that section . . . .” See id. 
 57 See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 133 (“[I]n light of this legislative history and the uniform pre-
1984 judicial interpretation of §605 . . . we conclude that §605 continues to apply.”). 
 58 See 88 F.3d at 469. The U.S. government appealed only the trial court’s dismissal of criminal 
charges under section 605, as opposed to section 605 and section 553, because section 605 has harsher 
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Seventh Circuit analyzed the legislative history and congressional intent to eval-
uate the applicability of section 605.59 In Norris, the court concluded that Con-
gress intended for section 553, and not section 605, to govern this situation.60 
The court held that allowing both section 553 and section 605 to apply to the 
retransmission of a radio communication via cable wire would render Congress’s 
enactment of section 553 superfluous, because section 605 would still regulate 
these multi-step transmissions.61 
Although the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the extensive case law and 
legislative history utilized by the Second Circuit, the court disagreed with its 
sister court’s interpretation, declaring that the Second Circuit took this judicial 
history and legislative intent out of context.62 The Seventh Circuit noted that the 
Second Circuit analyzed the phrase “[n]othing in [Section 553] is intended to 
affect the applicability of existing section 605 to theft of cable service” without 
considering this sentence’s meaning within its context.63 Accordingly, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that, in a multi-step retransmission process, Congress intended 
for section 605 to govern if reception occurred during the radio transmission 
step, whereas section 553 would apply when the unauthorized reception occurs 
during the cable wire transmission step.64 
                                                                                                                           
punishments for defendants that modify and sell cable television descrambler equipment. Id. at 463–
64. 
 59 See id. at 464–66. 
 60 See id. (using the history of federal communications legislation, from the Radio-Communica-
tions Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302, to the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, to demonstrate the history of regulating radio and cable wire trans-
missions separately). 
 61 See id. at 468 (reviewing legislative history in analyzing the separation of radio and cable wire 
telecommunication regulation). The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that courts around the country 
invoked section 605 to regulate cable wire transmissions as an attempt to judicially fill the gap in 
cable wire regulation caused by the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, prior to the 
enactment of section 553 in 1984. See id. See generally Ciminelli, 583 F. Supp. 158 (rejecting the 
argument that section 605 does not apply to the unauthorized interception of cable wire transmis-
sions); Cox Cable, 582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that section 605 still regulates cable 
wire communications); Porter Cnty. Cable, 624 F. Supp. 1 (applying section 605 to hold defendant 
liable for unauthorized interception of cable transmissions). 
 62 See Norris, 88 F.3d at 468–69. 
 63 See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–84 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4720–
21. In addition to this statement, Congress elaborated that situations involving both radio and wire 
transmissions “continue to be subject to resolution under section 605 to the extent reception or inter-
ception occurs prior to or not in connection with, distribution of the service over a cable system.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720 (emphasis added). 
 64 See Norris, 88 F.3d at 469. By contrast, the Second Circuit in International Cablevision inter-
preted this same language to mean that section 605 exclusively governs the radio transmission step, 
and both sections 605 and 553 regulate the cable wire transmission step. See 75 F.3d at 132. The Sev-
enth Circuit, on the other hand, held that the context of this statement demonstrated Congress’s true 
intent for section 553 to exclusively govern when the unauthorized reception occurs after the retrans-
mission via cable wire. See Norris, 88 F.3d at 469. 
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In 2001, in TKR Cable Company v. Cable City Corporation, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reinforced the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning by 
adopting this “exclusive” approach, holding that section 605 does not regulate 
these multi-step retransmission processes.65 In addition to relying on the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning, the Third Circuit also pointed out that Congress enacted sec-
tion 553 in 1984 in response to the rapid growth of the cable industry spawned 
by satellite television transmissions which utilized both radio and cable wire 
communications.66 The court believed this reinforced Congress’s intent to enact 
section 553 to exclusively regulate this retransmission via cable wire.67In 2014, 
in J&J Sports Productions, Inc. V. Mandell Family Ventures, LLC, The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit joined the Seventh and Third Circuits, 
holding that section 605 does not regulate the unauthorized reception of a cable 
wire retransmission which originated as a radio communication.68 
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S VIRTUE AND WHAT HAPPENS NEXT 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit correctly adopted 
the exclusive approach in holding that section 553 alone should govern the regu-
lation of cable piracy in a multi-step transmission process after the communica-
tion is transmitted via cable wire.69 First, this Part argues that the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach appropriately refuses to impose the unreasonable obligation on cus-
tomers to verify that they are receiving programming from a licensed cable oper-
ator.70 Next, this Part argues that the Fifth Circuit also ruled correctly in adopting 
the exclusive approach because the inclusive approach irrationally limits section 
553 to only local cable programming.71 Furthermore, this Part argues that the 
inclusive approach is flawed because the Second Circuit misinterpreted Con-
                                                                                                                           
 65 See 267 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001). TKR Cable also involved a suit against defendants 
caught selling cable television descramblers out of an office in Manhattan. See id. at 197. The court 
agreed that legislative history and congressional intent demonstrate that section 553 exclusively regu-
lates these transmissions because to apply section 605 would blur the lines between radio and wire 
communications and render section 553 superfluous. See id. at 205–06. The Third Circuit also criti-
cized the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Congress’s statement that section 605 regulates cable wire 
transmissions originating as radio communications “only to the extent reception occurs prior to or not 
in connection with distribution via cable wire.” See id. at 206–07; H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–84, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4720–21; supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing this point). 
 66 See TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 204; H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–84, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720–21 (explaining Congress’ concern with the growing problem of cable piracy). 
 67 See TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 204. 
 68 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 353. The Fifth Circuit adopted the exclusive approach reasoning 
that “we agree with the Third and Seventh Circuits that [the inclusive approach] unacceptably blurs 
the lines between radio and wire communications.” See id. at 352 (internal quotations omitted). 
 69 See J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures, LLC, 751 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
 70 See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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gress’ intent behind the enactment of section 553.72 This Part then argues that, on 
remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
should dismiss J&J Sport’s claim against the defendants, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court, if presented with the opportunity, should resolve the circuit split by adopt-
ing the exclusive approach.73 
First, the Fifth Circuit ruled correctly in J&J Sports because allowing sec-
tion 605 to regulate the unauthorized reception of a cable wire retransmission 
imposes an unreasonable obligation on cable customers to verify that they are 
ordering from a licensed cable provider.74 Although section 553 contains a safe 
harbor provision that could excuse innocent defendants such as Mandell Family 
Ventures from strict liability, section 605 contains no such safe harbor—under 
this provision Mandell Family Ventures would likely be liable for statutory dam-
ages for innocently receiving an unauthorized program.75 As a result, allowing 
section 605 to regulate these situations functionally imposes the obligation on 
the consumer to take the additional step to verify that their cable provider has the 
license to provide the program.76 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit correctly ruled 
that section 605 does not apply to these multi-step retransmission processes to 
avoid imposing this unreasonable obligation on cable customers.77 
Second, the Fifth Circuit was correct to eschew the Second Circuit’s inclu-
sive approach, because that interpretation of the statute irrationally limits section 
553 to the regulation of only local cable programming.78 If the court held that 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 73 See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 74 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348–49. The court noted that “the statute does not hinge liability 
on the cable customer taking additional steps.” Id. at 349. 
 75 See id. at 349; see also J&J Prods., Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-
02489-BF, 2012 WL 4757694, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2012) (implying that defendants can be liable 
for statutory damages under section 605). 
 76 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348–49. In J&J Sports, the plaintiff argued that the safe harbor of 
section 553 extends only to receipt of cable services not authorized by an authorized cable operator, 
and the court found it unreasonable to impose the additional step on the customer of verifying that the 
cable operator is licensed to provide the program. See id. Accordingly, to extend liability under sec-
tion 605 would impose this same obligation on customers to ensure that they are legally receiving an 
authorized program so as to avoid liability under federal communications laws. See id. Requiring a 
customer to take this extra step is completely unreasonable and not supported by any language 
in the relevant laws. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605 (2012); J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348–49. 
 77 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348–49; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the Fifth Circuit’s holding in J&J Sports, which adopted the Seventh Circuit’s exclusive 
approach). 
 78 See TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2001). Congress en-
acted section 553 in response to the rapid growth of the cable industry, and the corresponding 
increase in cable piracy, caused by the development of satellite cable delivery. See id. at 204; 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–84 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4720–21. Satellite 
cable delivery made it economically feasible to transmit national cable programming to local cable 
systems by utilizing different mediums in a multi-step transmission process. See TKR Cable, 267 F.3d 
at 204; H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83–84, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720–21. 
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section 605 applies to these multi-step transmissions, section 553 would be con-
fined to regulation of local cable programming that utilizes cable wire technolo-
gy, which represents a relatively minor portion of the national cable industry.79 
Moreover, had the Fifth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s application of sec-
tion 605, section 553 would not regulate the very section of the cable industry 
which the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 was intended to govern— 
the national satellite television market.80 
Third, the Fifth Circuit appropriately refused to adopt the inclusive ap-
proach because the Second Circuit’s interpretation of congress’s expressed intent 
is flawed.81 The Second Circuit concluded that congress intended for section 605 
to exclusively govern the radio transmission step and allow both sections 553 
and 605 to regulate the cable wire step.82 Analyzing the relevant passage of leg-
islative history as a whole, it becomes clear that congress intended section 605 to 
govern the radio transmission step of a multi-step process, and section 553 to 
exclusively regulate the cable wire step, as held by the Third and Seventh Cir-
cuits.83 Moreover, International Cablevision reviewed section 605 as it applies 
to a defendant’s wrongful actions selling cable descramblers which allow cus-
tomers to pirate unauthorized premium programming.84 Alternatively, J&J 
Sports involved an innocent cable customer facing strict liability as a result of 
their cable provider’s mistake, as opposed to a defendant’s wrongful actions en-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 205 (examining the historical context surrounding the enactment of 
section 553 in response to the growth of national cable industry); see also Lampman, supra note 22, at 
565–66 (highlighting satellite technology as a fast growing industry driving the growth and develop-
ment of the television industry). 
 80 See TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 204–05 (examining the context of Congress’s enactment of section 
553 after the growth of the national cable industry); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779, 2796 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)). 
 81 See United States v. Norris, 88 F.3d 462, 469 (7th Cir. 1996); Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 
75 F.3d 123, 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1996); supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text (detailing the reason-
ing behind the Second Circuit’s inclusive approach). 
 82 See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 132. 
 83 See id. (analyzing the language, “[multi-step retransmission processes] continue to be subject to 
resolution under [§ 605] to the extent reception or interception occurs prior to or not in connection 
with, distribution of the service over a cable system” that appeared in House Report 98-934); H.R. 
REP. NO. 98-934, at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4720. The court ignored, however, 
the immediately preceding sentence in the House Report, which stated Congress’s intent to 
have Section 553 govern “theft of a service from the point at which it is actually being distrib-
uted over a cable system.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-934, at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720; 
see TKR Cable, 267 F.3d at 207; Norris, 88 F.3d at 469; Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 132.  
 84 See Int’l Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 126. In this case, the Second Circuit gave deference to 
pre-1984 case law applying section 605 to cable wire transmissions for similar wrongful ac-
tions. See id. at 130. J&J Sports is also distinguishable from International Cablevision because J&J 
Sports involved an innocent consumer whereas International Cablevision involved a defendant who 
wrongfully sold television descramblers to aid in cable piracy. See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 347; Int’l 
Cablevision, 75 F.3d at 126. 
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abling cable piracy.85 International Cablevision is distinguishable, therefore, 
because the defendant’s conduct was wrongful, whereas Mandell Family Ven-
tures was an innocent cable customer, further supporting the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion to follow the Seventh Circuit’s exclusive approach to protect the innocent 
consumer.86 
On remand, the trial court, following the exclusive approach and the in-
struction of the Fifth Circuit, should dismiss J&J Sport’s claims against Mandell 
Family Ventures because of the safe harbor provision in section 553, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court, if presented with the chance to address the issue, should 
resolve the split by adopting the exclusive approach.87 With the Fifth Circuit 
holding that Section 605 does not apply, the district court will only consider sec-
tion 553.88 Under that provision, the court should find that Mandell Family Ven-
tures falls squarely within the current safe harbor because they were specifically 
authorized to receive the program from their cable provider, Time Warner Ca-
ble.89 This finding would not frustrate the legislative intent to maintain strict 
regulation of cable piracy, because Mandell Family Ventures is an innocent con-
sumer who paid for a program from their normal cable provider.90 Instead, this 
finding will justly protect innocent consumers from facing strict liability under 
section 553 as a result of their cable provider’s mistaken authorization of a cable 
program.91 Furthermore, if presented with the opportunity to review the circuit 
split regarding the application of section 605, the U.S. Supreme Court should 
recognize the flaws of the inclusive approach and adopt the exclusive approach 
in order to protect innocent consumers such as Mandell Family Ventures.92 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 347 (detailing that defendants paid for and received the program 
from their authorized cable provider and did not attempt to pirate the program); see also Susan C. 
Portin, Comment, Piracy and the Law: It’s Time to Clear Up the Confusion, 33 EMORY L.J. 825, 862 
(1984) (noting that the target for enforcement of federal piracy regulation should be those who pirate 
for profit such as manufacturers and distributors of unauthorized interception equipment). 
 86 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 347; see also Russell, supra note 14, at 1266 (stating that Congress 
enacted section 553 to prevent cable piracy and regulate black-boxes which permit piracy, not to pro-
vide cable companies with “extremely fine-grained control” over customer’s use of an authorized 
program). 
 87 See J&J Sports, 751 F.3d at 348–50 (analyzing the safe harbor provision of section 553). 
 88 See id. at 353 (holding that section 605 does not apply and remanding for further proceedings 
according to section 553). 
 89 See id. at 348–50 (reviewing the safe harbor provision of section 553). J&J Sports argued that 
the safe harbor provision of section 553 should be limited to customers who are authorized by a li-
censed cable provider, as opposed to any cable provider, but the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt this 
view of the provision. See id. 
 90 See id. at 348–49 n.3 (noting that the safe harbor protects only the innocent recipient, like 
Mandell Family Ventures, and that plaintiffs are not without recourse as the unauthorized cable pro-
vider may be liable for authorizing the broadcast). 
 91 See id. at 348–50. 
 92 Cf. id. (adopting the exclusive approach and holding that section 553 exclusively regulates 
unauthorized reception of a cable transmission which has been retransmitted from a radio 
communication). 
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CONCLUSION 
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 should not regulate the 
unauthorized reception of a cable transmission that has been retransmitted from 
a radio communication. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit correctly ruled that section 
553 exclusively governs these modern, multi-step retransmission processes, such 
as those involved in J&J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Mandell Family Ventures, 
LLC. Allowing section 605 to regulate these transmissions would unreasonably 
require a cable customer to take the additional step to verify that their cable pro-
vider is licensed to provide the programming and would irrationally limit section 
553 to the regulation of only local cable programming and not national satellite 
programming. On remand, the court should dismiss J&J Sports’ claims against 
Mandell Family Ventures, and the Supreme Court of the United States should 
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